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Law as Scapegoat 
Cary Coglianese* 
 
 Around the world, public trust in governmental institutions and legal 
systems has been wavering for years. In the wake of this declining trust, 
populist and nationalist demagogues have emerged in many countries to make 
nostalgic appeals and sow racial and ethnic division.1 These populist leaders 
also often advance policies that retreat from both global engagement and 
democratic commitments, leading their countries on paths toward market 
isolationism and authoritarian government.  
The causal connection between decreasing public trust and increasing 
populism are complex and interactive. Decreased trust and confidence in 
government provides a fertile soil within which populism grows, but populist 
leaders can themselves stoke fires of distrust and discord, exacerbating crises 
of public confidence rather than working to restore faith in institutions of 
governance. This concluding chapter focuses on a particularly sinister way that 
populist leaders can seek to fuel public distrust: by treating the law itself as a 
scapegoat. By blaming legislation and regulation for the very social and 
economic conditions that make members of the public angry and frustrated, 
populist leaders risk a downward, self-perpetuating spiral of public cynicism, 
making it harder for societies to ward off a collapse of governmental legitimacy 
and efficacy.  
Using examples from political developments in the United Kingdom, 
Brazil, and the United States, I argue that legal scapegoating is an important, 
possibly growing, phenomenon worthy of attention. I also explicate what I see 
as some of the political economy dynamics behind populist leaders’ efforts to 
treat law as a scapegoat. In particular, I show how relatively easy it is to make 
law as a scapegoat. In this regard, law bears surprising similarities to other 
 
* Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Political Science, Director, Penn Program on 
Regulation, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This paper expands on the keynote 
address the author delivered at the International Association of Legislation’s conference on 
‘The Crisis of Confidence in Legislation,’ held in Rome in 2019. The author is grateful for 
valuable comments and conversations with Nicoletta Rangone, Maria De Benedetto, and 
conference participants. He appreciates helpful research assistance by Isabella Fierro, Ben 
Meltzer, Roxanna Pasquier, Emma Ronzetti, Madeleine Vaziri, and Roshie Xing. Special 
thanks go to Emma Ronzetti for truly stellar and extensive assistance in preparing this paper. 
This paper is forthcoming as the concluding chapter in Maria De Benedetto, Nicola Lupo & 
Nicoletta Rangone, eds., The Crisis of Confidence in Legislation. 
1 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian 
Populism (Cambridge University Press 2019). 
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vulnerable targets of populist antipathy, such as migrants and minorities. The 
law can be easily framed as ‘the other’ in times of economic stress—and easily 
blamed for negative social conditions which emanate from entirely other 
causes. Legal scholars and social scientists have more work to do understand 
the precise causes and full consequences of legal scapegoating. But the first 
step toward such greater understanding is to identify the phenomenon as real 
and worthy of inclusion in a larger research agenda focused more generally on 
the causes and consequences of a global crisis of public confidence in the rule 
of law.  
 
The Crisis in Legal Confidence  
 
In countries around the world, members of the public have lost 
confidence in their public institutions.2 Only a minority of people—45 percent 
 
2 Political scientist Donald Kettl has observed that ‘more than half of the public in more than 
half of the countries distrust their governments.’ Donald F. Kettl, Can Governments Earn Our 
Trust? (Polity Press 2017) 1. The OECD notes that ‘the 2008 global financial crisis and ensuing 
recession … profoundly shook the public’s confidence in institutions, and people’s trust in 
public institutions has fared especially poorly.’ OECD, ‘Trust in Government’ (OECD, 2019) 
< https://www.oecd.org/gov/trust-in-government.htm> accessed 29 January 2020. Despite 
this secular downward trend, some polling data indicate that, in the face of a global outbreak 
of a novel coronavirus in early 2020, people around the world turned to their governments to 
protect them—leading to a quick uptick in trust in governmental institutions. Spring 2020 
polling by the Edelman communications firm has shown that, across ten major countries, trust 
in government has increased on average of about 13 percent compared to polling from the fall 
2019. Edelman, ‘Edelman Trust Barometer 2020: Global Report’ (Edelman, 2020) 
<https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/440941/Trust%20Barometer%202020/2020%20Edelman%20Trust 
%20Barometer%20Global%20Report.pdf> accessed 23 June 2020; Edelman, ‘Spring Update: 
Trust and the Covid-19 Pandemic’ (Edelman, 2020) < https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/ 
files/aatuss191/files/2020-05/2020%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Spring%20Update 
%20U.S..pdf> accessed 23 June 2020 (comparing data for Canada, France, Germany, India, 
Japan, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States). This 
does not mean that trust in government has increased in every country since the outbreak nor 
that it is still at a normatively desirable level in many countries. From just April to May 2020, 
polling by Reuters showed that in the United Kingdom the public’s trust just the public health 
information released by the government about the coronavirus declined from 67 percent to 48 
percent. Richard Fletcher, Antonis Kalogeropoulos, and Rasmus Kleos Nielsen, ‘Trust in UK 
Government and News Media COVID-19 Information Down, Concerns over Misinformation 
from Government and Politicians Up’ (Reuters, June 2020) <https://reutersinstitute. 
politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-06/UK_COVID-19_News_and_Information_Factsheet_4 
_FINAL.pdf> accessed 23 June 2020. In the United States, trust in the federal government has 
declined among Democrats from the fall 2019 to the spring of 2020. Edelman, ‘Edelman Trust 
Barometer 2020: Spring Update: Trust and the COVID-19 Pandemic’ (Edelman, 2020) <https: 
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on average—in OECD countries have faith in their governments.3 In the 
United States, the level of public trust has declined markedly over the last half 
century: in 1964, about 77 percent of the U.S. public trusted its government 
most or all of the time,4 while in 2019 that level was only 17 percent.5 In Brazil, 
only 37 percent of the public say they trust their government.6 The British 
public’s trust in its government has not risen above 41 percent since 2012.7 
Such low levels of confidence in these and other countries undoubtedly 
derive from a variety of factors which vary from country to country. Relevant 
factors include economic dislocations in the wake of the global financial crisis 
of 2008, as well as increasing ideological polarization and a widening gulf of 
inequality in many societies.8 Distrust can be exacerbated by high levels of 
unemployment and the lack of opportunities for individuals to overcome 
socioeconomic barriers. It can also be fueled by a government’s inability to 
respond adequately to dire economic disruptions, natural disasters, and public 
health threats. High levels of corruption also propagate distrust.  
In more recent years, the rise of social media has tended to fuel public 
suspicion and cynicism. In many countries, members of the public worry about 
 
//www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2020-05/2020%20Edelman%20Trust%20 
Barometer %20Spring%20Update.pdf> accessed 23 June 2020.  
3 OECD ‘Government at a Glance 2019’ (OECD, 2019) <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ 
governance/government-at-a-glance-2019_8ccf5c38-en;jsessionid=OuCTvjDASmymfud-2qRf_ 
BKt.ip-10-240-5-99> accessed 23 March 2020. 
4 Kettl, (n 2) 5. 
5 Pew Research Center, ‘Little Public Support for Reductions in Federal Spending’ (PRC, 11 
April 2019) <https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/little-public-support-for-reductions-
in-federal-spending/> accessed 9 February 2020. 
6 Edelman, ‘Edelman Trust Barometer 2020: Global Report’ (Edelman, 2020) 
<https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/440941/Trust%20Barometer%202020/2020%20Edelman%20Tru
st%20Barometer%20Global%20Report.pdf?utm_campaign=Global:%20Trust%20Barometer%202
020&utm_source=Website;%20Edelman,%202020%20Spring%20update,%20https://www.edelma
n.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2020-05/2020%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Spring 
%20Update.pdf> accessed 23 March 2020. 
7 Edelman, ‘Edelman Trust Barometer 2020: UK Supplement’ (Edelman, 2020) 
<https://www.edelman.co.uk/sites/g/files/aatuss301/files/2020-02/2020%20Edelman%20 
Trust%20Barometer%20UK%20Launch%20Deck.pdf> accessed 23 March 2020. 
8 OECD, ‘Trust and Public Policy – How Better Governance Can Help Rebuild Public Trust’ 
(OECD, 2017) < http://www.oecd.org/corruption-integrity/reports/trust-and-public-policy-
9789264268920-en.html> accessed 23 June 2020; Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, ‘Trust 
in Public Institutions over the Business Cycle’ (2011) 101(3) Am. Econ. Rev. 
<https://www.nber.org/papers/w16891> accessed 23 June 2020; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. 
Zelikow, and David C. King (eds.), Why People Don’t Trust Government (Harvard University 
Press 1997) 111-132.  
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the corruption of journalistic institutions and the propagation of so-called ‘fake 
news’. Global polling has indicated that as many as 70 percent of adults around 
the world are concerned about the use of misinformation as a political weapon.9 
Perhaps as worrisome, 63 percent report that they cannot distinguish 
legitimate journalism from fake news.10  
A climate of fake news can undermine trust in democratic elections in 
ways that play into the hands of populist or authoritarian leaders. Today, 
mistrust is exploited by such leaders who seek to blame ‘the other’—often 
migrants and minorities—for socioeconomic woes. Poorer and less-educated 
individuals in majority ethnic and racial groups may be most vulnerable to 
being heavily influenced by populist propaganda, 11 at least in part because they 
tend to have lower levels of trust.12 Overall, divisive nationalist movements 
have fostered and relied on an ‘us versus them’ mentality to gain popularity.13 
When mistrust festers, politicians with motives that are far from altruistic can 
exploit and deepen that distrust, sowing conditions for the dismantling of 
liberal, democratic governance.  
 
Scapegoating Law 
 
 Among the many strategies that populist or nationalist leaders rely on 
to build support is one that scapegoats the law and the legal system. 
Scapegoating the law goes beyond merely criticizing specific laws and arguing 
that they need to be repealed or amended. All politicians do that. Scapegoating 
goes further. It involves vitriolic attacks that falsely blame the law for a nation’s 
social and economic woes, thereby contributing to a sense of crisis in existing 
legal institutions. That crisis then purports to justify the need for a political 
savior to rescue society and make dramatic changes to restore order and 
 
9 Uri Friedman, ‘Trust is Collapsing in America,’ (The Atlantic, 2018) <https://www. 
theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/trust-trump-america-world/550964/> accessed 27 
April 2020. 
10 Ibid. 
11 J. Lawrence Broz, Jeffrey Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth, ‘Populism in Place: The 
Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash’ (2019) International Organization 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3501263> accessed 23 April 2020. 
12 Pew Research Center, ‘Key Findings about Americans’ Declining Trust in Government and 
Each Other’ (PRC, 22 July 2019) <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/22/key-
findings-about-americans-declining-trust-in-government-and-each-other/> accessed 29 April 
2020. 
13 Ian Bremmer, Us vs. Them: The Failure of Globallism (Portfolio/Penguin 2018).  
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prosperity.14 Ironically, populist or nationalist leaders may even scapegoat the 
law at the same time that they claim to seek to restore law and order during 
disruptive times, especially by invoking law to constrain migration or trample 
dissent. Authoritarians today often seek to consolidate power by preserving at 
least the fig leaf of legality to their actions—but that does not necessarily stop 
them from seeking support by blaming law too.15 
 In recent years, legal scapegoating has been a significant part of the 
political strategy and rhetorical appeal behind populist-oriented political 
leaders in democratic countries on at least three continents, specifically in the 
United Kingdom, Brazil, and the United States. Each of these countries has 
witnessed high levels of public mistrust that has helped to provide an initial 
platform for populist movements. In each of these countries, successful 
populist strategies have included making law a particular target of blame by 
using exaggerated and false claims about how the law, particularly regulation, 
contributes to each nation’s economic woes.  
 
Brexit and Legal Scapegoating 
 
The Brexit campaign was, in many respects, a rather conventional 
populist campaign against outsiders, targeting the European Union (E.U.), 
criticizing open borders, and lamenting a loss of British sovereignty. These 
conventional appeals were used by advocates of Brexit to blame the E.U. for 
inflated healthcare costs and various other maladies affecting the British 
public. But legal scapegoating was also central to the narrative underlying the 
Brexit campaign. Politicians repeatedly raised examples purporting to show 
the oppressiveness of E.U. regulations, even framing European rules as absurd.  
Boris Johnson—who would eventually become the Prime Minister who 
finalized the U.K.’s Brexit deal in 2020—showed himself to be particularly 
adept at crafting reductio absurdum arguments against E.U. regulation as a 
means of building support for the initial public vote in 2016 on whether Britain 
should leave the European Union. Johnson claimed that Europeans had 
adopted ludicrous regulations governing the smell of manure,16 the shape of 
 
14 On some of the dynamics involved in scapegoating elites and building public support for 
populism, see Michael Hameleers, Linda Bos, and Claes de Vreese, ‘Framing Blame: Toward 
a Better Understanding of the Effects of Populist Communication on Populist Party 
Preferences’ 2017 20(7) Information, Communication, & Society <https://www.tandfonline. 
com/doi/full/10.1080/17457289.2017.1407326> accessed 16 April 2020. 
15 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (Crown 2018). 
16 William Booth and Karla Adam, ‘Want to Understand Boris Johnson, Britain’s Probable 
Next Prime Minister? Read His Incendiary Journalism’ (The Washington Post, 20 July 2019) 
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bananas,17 and the size of condoms.18 He ‘warned Britons that their prawn-
cocktail-flavored chips could be banned, that their sausages were under threat 
and that their fishermen would be required to wear hairnets’.19 These kind of 
misleading or false claims permeated British popular discourse in the lead up 
to the initial vote to authorize the United Kingdom to withdraw from the 
European Union.  
Following the public vote authorizing Brexit, ‘leave’ advocates 
continued to make similar exaggerated claims during the period when U.K. 
leaders negotiated with E.U. officials over the terms of the nation’s 
withdrawal. In January 2018, for example, Conservative Member of 
Parliament Jacob Rees-Mogg, who has since become the leader of the House 
of Commons, gave a major address in which he envisioned two different types 
of futures for the United Kingdom. One future, he said, would perpetuate ‘a 
gradual erosion of our wealth, our success and ultimately our values’.20 This 
erosion would follow from continuing ‘to put our future into [the] constrained 
hands’ of European regulators.21 But there was an alternative future, he said, 
one which would liberate Britain from the economic devastation allegedly 
caused by E.U. regulation. Britain could throw off the E.U.’s regulatory 
shackles and create ‘a bright future’, one in which regulation ‘encourages 
enterprise’ and helps ensure that ‘the next great economic revolution will be 
made in Britain’.22 According to Rees-Mogg’s argument, the only barrier to 
British prosperity seemed to be the application of European law—as if home-
grown U.K. regulation could single-handedly drive the country’s economic 
resurgence.  
 Boris Johnson also continued to denigrate E.U. law in the period 
following the public vote supporting Brexit. In one famous instance, he railed 
 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/boris-johnson-britains-likely-next-prime-
minister-is-a-hack--a-journalist-who-has-reached-the-pinnacle-of-power/2019/07/20/0fff5146- 
a98d-11e9-8733-48c87235f396_story.html> accessed 19 January 2020. 
17 Jon Henley, ‘Is the EU Really Dictating the Shape of Your Bananas?’ (The Guardian, 11 May 
2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/11/boris-johnson-launches-the-vote-
leave-battlebus-in-cornwall> accessed 21 January 2020. 
18 Christian Oliver and Jim Brunsden, ‘Fact or Fiction? Boris Johnsons Euro Claims’ (The 
Financial Times, 22 February 2016) <https://www.ft.com/content/6b31460a-d96b-11e5-a72f-
1e7744c66818> accessed 28 January 2020. 
19 Booth and Adam (n 16). 
20 ‘Speech - by Jacob Rees-Mogg M.P. at Churcher’s College, Petersfield, 25 January 2018’ 
(Richard Drax, 25 January 2018) <https://www.richarddrax.com/news/speech-jacob-rees-
mogg-mp-churchers-college-petersfield-25-january-2018> accessed 19 January 2020. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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against ‘pointless, expensive, environmentally damaging’ regulations imposed 
on the shipping of kippers, a smoked herring that many Britons consume at 
breakfast.23 He waved a package of the smoked fish above his head at a 
campaign rally, decrying E.U. regulations that purportedly required the 
producers of kipper to ship fish in plastic ‘pillows’ with ice. If only the United 
Kingdom could escape from the E.U.’s ‘regulatory overkill’, Johnson promised, 
then the nation could ‘bring the kippers back’.24  
Of course, it turns out that Johnson’s claims about E.U. kipper 
shipping requirements were simply not true. As both the British press and the 
European Commission itself confirmed, the kipper rules lambasted by Johnson 
were British regulations, not E.U. ones.25 But when scapegoating law, facts do 
not matter.  
 
Brazil, Bolsonaro, and Bullying the Law 
 
In January 2019, Jair Bolsonaro assumed the office of the Brazilian 
presidency after having won a 55-percent vote in a runoff election.26 Bolsonaro, 
an ardent right-wing politician, has been wont to say degrading things about 
women and LGBTQ individuals.27 He has even said that minorities should 
 
23 Ben Quinn, ‘Kipper Rules Boris Johnson Blamed on EU Are Actually British, Says Brussels’ 
(The Guardian, 18 July 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jul/18/boris-
johnson-claims-about-kippers-fishy-brussels-says> accessed 27 January 2020. 
24 Alice Tidey, ‘EU Debunks Boris Johnson’s Fishy Claims About Food Regulation’ 
(EuroNews, 19 September 2019) <https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/19/eu-debunks-boris-
johnson-s-fishy-claims-about-food-regulation> accessed 29 January 2020. 
25 Ben Quinn, ‘Kipper Rules Boris Johnson Blamed on EU Are Actually British, Says Brussels’ 
(The Guardian, 18 July 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jul/18/boris-
johnson-claims-about-kippers-fishy-brussels-says> accessed 27 January 2020. 
26 Ernesto Londoño and Shasta Darlington, ‘Jair Bolsonaro Wins Brazil’s Presidency, in a Shift 
to the Far Right’ (The New York Times, 28 October 2018) <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
10/28/world/americas/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-election.html> accessed 27 January 2020. 
27 Jill Langlois and Kate Linthicum, ‘Far Right Populist Jair Bolsonaro Wins Brazil 
Presidential Election’ (Los Angeles Times, 28 October 2018) < 
https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-brazil-election-20181028-story.html> accessed 21 April 
2020; Terrence McCoy, ‘’Anyone Could Be a Threat’: In Bolsonaro’s Brazil, LGBT People 
Take Personal Defense into Their Own Hands’ (The Washington Post, 22 July 2019) 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/anyone-could-be-a-threat-in-
bolsonaros-brazil-lgbt-people-are-taking-personal-defense-into-their-own-hands/2019/07/ 
21/5aaa7578-a716-11e9-a3a6-ab670962db05_story.html> accessed 20 April 2020. 
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‘either adapt or simply vanish’.28 He has flirted with authoritarianism, at times 
touting torture and celebrating coups.29 But at the same time, he also 
campaigned for the presidency on a decidedly anti-regulatory platform, and 
his attacks on Brazilian regulation and legal norms have continued during his 
time as President. 
Brazil had experienced a severe recession from 2014 to 2016, which 
undoubtedly made attractive Bolsonaro’s promises to free the country from 
regulation as means of helping the economy.30 Brazil has long had a 
bureaucratic-heavy government replete with ‘serpentine red tape’ for opening 
up new businesses.31 But while reducing unnecessary administrative burdens 
would surely seem an appropriate reform idea, that hardly means that 
regulation was to blame for the country’s sluggish recovery from its recession 
nor that lifting regulation would serve as the country’s ticket to restored 
economic growth and prosperity.32 After all, Brazil had a dense bureaucratic 
system even before the recession, and other factors, such as high taxes, crime, 
and real estate prices, explain what is sometimes known as the ‘Brazil cost’—
that is, the higher cost of doing business in Brazil.33 Regulation neither caused 
Brazil’s deep recession nor could it be any panacea for restoring the country’s 
economic vigor.34 
 
28 Jean Chemnick, ‘Conservationists Worry about Amazon’s Fate over Bolsonaro’s Victory in 
Brazil’ (Scientific American, 30 October 2018) <https://www.scientificamerican.com/ 
article/conservationists-worry-about-amazons-fate-after-bolsonaros-victory-in-brazil/> 
accessed 28 January 2020. 
29 ‘Brazil: Bolsonaro’s Coup Celebration Barred by Judge’ (BBC, 30 March 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-47757616> accessed 19 January 2020; Jamie 
Timson, ‘Jair Bolsonaro: How ‘South America’s Trump’ Will Change Brazil (The Week, 29 
October 2018) <https://www.theweek.co.uk/97396/jair-bolsonaro-how-south-america-s-
trump-will-change-brazil> accessed 25 January 2020. 
30 ‘What to Make of Brazil’s New Firebrand President, Jair Bolsonaro’ (The Economist, 3 
January 2019) < https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/01/03/what-to-make-of-
brazils-new-firebrand-president-jair-bolsonaro> accessed 5 February 2020. 
31 ‘Jair Bolsonaro and the Perversion of Liberalism’ (The Economist, 27 October 2018) 
<https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/10/27/jair-bolsonaro-and-the-perversion-of-
liberalism > accessed 10 February 2020. 
32 For discussion of the politics of administrative burdens, see Pamela Herd and Donald P. 
Moynihan, Administrative Burden: Policymaking by Other Means (Russell Sage 2018). 
33 ‘Special Report – Brazil: The Price is Wrong’ (The Economist, 28 September 2013) 
<https://www.economist.com/special-report/2013/09/26/the-price-is-wrong> accessed 10 
February 2020.  
34 Bruno Queiroz Cunha, ‘From Regulation and Development to Development with 
Regulation: Alternatives to Regulatory Orthodoxy’ (ECPR Standing Group on Regulatory 
Governance Biennial Conference, Lousanne/Switzerland, 4 to 6 July 2018) accessed 3 May 
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Yet candidate Bolsonaro proclaimed that regulations were ‘suffocating’ 
the country.35 As a citizen, Bolsonaro had himself been fined for breaking 
environmental regulations in 2012, so perhaps it was not surprising that he 
made environmental regulations a special target for his rhetorical ire.36 He 
proposed on the campaign trail making the Environment Ministry a 
subdivision within the Agriculture Ministry.37 He also promised that, if 
elected, he would get rid of the ‘fine industry’, the phrase he used for regulators 
because they impose monetary fines on those who violate the law.38 He urged 
relaxing mining regulations.39 He also publicly discounted climate change. At 
one point, candidate Bolsonaro said that, if he were elected, he would withdraw 
Brazil from the Paris Agreement, even though that is not something that the 
Brazilian president can do by himself.40 
Candidate Bolsonaro also rejected regulations that protected Amazon 
territory occupied by indigenous people, promising that under his leadership 
 
2020. In a review of national regulatory policies and procedures in 2016, the OECD actually 
reported that Brazil outranked all other OECD countries in its processes of public involvement 
in the regulatory process. The OECD did, though, indicate that Brazil could do better to make 
the use of regulatory impact assessment and ex post evaluation more ‘consistent’ across 
government. ‘Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance Latin America 2016: Brazil’ 
(OECD, 2016) <https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Brazil-regulatory-policy-ireg-
2016.pdf> accessed 15 February 2020. 
35 Justin Wise, ‘The Amazon Rainforest is Burning at a Record Rate. Here’s What’s Going 
On’ (The Hill, 21 August 2019) < https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/458281-the-
amazon-rainforest-is-burning-at-a-record-rate-heres-whats-going> accessed 13 February 2020.  
36 Carol Pires, ‘The Trump Ally Who is Allowing the Amazon to Burn’ (The New Yorker, 28 
August 2019) <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-trump-ally-who-is-
allowing-the-amazon-to-burn> accessed 12 February 2020.  
37 Jonathan Watts, ‘Fears for Amazon as Bolsonaro Plans to Merge Environment and 
Agriculture Ministries’ (The Guardian, 1 November 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2018/nov/01/bolsonaro-environment-agriculture-ministries-amazon> accessed 20 
February 2020. 
38 Mariana Simões, ‘Brazil’s Bolsonaro on the Environment, in His Own Words’ (The New 
York Times, 27 August 2019) <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/world/americas/ 
bolsonaro-brazil-environment.html> accessed 28 January 2020. 
39 Ibid. 
40 And in fact, Bolsonaro has not made moves to have Brazil exit the Paris Agreement. But as 
president he did back out of hosting the next COP25 climate change meeting that had been 
scheduled to take place in Brazil. Jake Spring, ‘No Longer the Host, Brazil Still Aims for Key 
Role at UN Climate Talks’ (Reuters, 15 October 2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
climate-change-brazil/no-longer-the-host-brazil-still-aims-for-key-role-at-u-n-climate-talks-
idUSKBN1WU2YF> accessed 28 January 2020.  
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‘there won’t be a square centimeter demarcated as an indigenous reserve’.41 He 
blamed the laws protecting indigenous peoples lands for the country’s 
economic woes, because, in his account, ‘where there is indigenous land, there 
is wealth underneath it’42—as if lifting regulations would reveal a pot of gold. 
Brazil’s agency for indigenous affairs, the National Indian Foundation 
(FUNAI), found itself especially targeted by Bolsonaro’s violent rhetoric: ‘If 
I’m elected, I’ll serve a blow to FUNAI; a blow to the neck. There’s no other 
way. It’s not useful anymore’.43 
 Since assuming office, Bolsonaro has pursued his targeted attacks on 
regulation. One of his first actions as president was to end new designations of 
land protected for indigenous people.44 He shifted responsibility for certain 
environmental regulatory responsibilities to the ministry of agriculture headed 
by a former industry representative.45 He interfered with health authorities 
and energy regulators. His highly popular justice minister quit, accusing 
Bolsonaro of having improperly meddled in law enforcement matters.46 All the 
while, Bolsonaro’s administration has rolled back regulations and slashed 
funding for regulatory enforcement.47  
 
41 Somini Sengupta, ‘What Jair Bolsonaro’s Victory Could Mean for the Amazon, and the 
Planet’ (The New York Times, 17 October 2018) < https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
10/17/climate/brazil-election-amazon-environment.html> accessed 16 February 2020. 
42 Ibid. 
43 ‘What Brazil’s President, Jair Bolsonaro, Has Said About Brazil’s Indigenous Peoples’ 
(Survival International) <https://www.survivalinternational.org/articles/3540-Bolsonaro> 
accessed 16 February 2020. He has also said that it is ‘a shame that the Brazilian cavalry wasn’t 
as efficient as the Americans, who exterminated the Indians.’ Fiona Watson, ‘In Just 100 Days, 
Jair Bolsonaro Has Destroyed the Lives of Brazil’s Indigenous People’ (The Independent, 10 
April 2019) <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-indigenous-people-
president-100-days-a8863161.html> accessed 23 February 2020. 
44 Shannon Sims, ‘Here’s How Jair Bolsonaro Wants to Transform Brazil’ (The Atlantic, 12 
January 2019) <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/01/heres-how-jair-
bolsonaro-wants-to-transform-brazil/580207/> accessed 23 February 2020.  
45 Watts (n 37). 
46 Ricardo Brito, ‘Brazil ‘Super Minister’ Quits in Bolsonaro’s Worst Crisis Yet’ (Reuters, 24 
April 2020) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics/bolsonaro-fires-head-of-
brazils-federal-police-amid-political-spat-idUSKCN2261KW?il=0> accessed 30 April 2020; 
Tom Phillips, ‘Brazil’s Star Justice Minister Sergio Moro Resigns in Blow to Jair Bolsonaro’ 
(The Guardian, 24 April 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/24/brazil-
justice-minister-sergio-moro-resigns-jair-bolsonaro> accessed 30 April 2020.  
47 Oliver Stuenkel, ‘Bolsonaro Fans the Flames’ (Foreign Affairs, 30 August 2019) 
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2019-08-30/bolsonaro-fans-flames> 
accessed 25 February 2020. 
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In addition to delivering on his promise of reductions in fines, 
Bolsonaro has ‘fostered an atmosphere of impunity, encouraging loggers, 
ranchers, miners, and farmers to breach regulations and cut into the forest’.48 
As large sections of the Amazon continue to burn, the president, apparently 
‘[w]ithout providing evidence, … accused environmental NGOs of having 
started the fires’.49 Notwithstanding commitments Brazil made under the Paris 
Agreement to slow deforestation, Bolsonaro berated the ‘environmental 
psychoses’ that have led to legal limits on Amazonian development, stating 
that ‘[w]e are going to get rid of all this crap in Brazil — crap that is corrupt 
and communist’.50 
 Bolsonaro’s government has reportedly ‘incited its supporters to 
pressure the judiciary to issue verdicts in accordance with its wishes’.51 Wildlife 
preserve officials ‘have reported being met with increasingly violent responses 
from miners and forestry workers as they perform their environmental-
protection duties’.52 It is said that Bolsonaro ‘stands for “order“, but not the 
law’.53 But the ‘order’ he seems to prefer leaves plenty of room for the 
toleration, if not encouragement, of attacks on the law. 
 
Donald Trump’s Assault on U.S. Law 
 
 Bolsonaro is often called ‘The Trump of the Tropics’.54 The 
comparison is apt not only because of both presidents’ coarse, aggressive 
 
48 Stuenkel (n 46). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Andres Schipani, ‘Brazil: Jair Bolsonaro Pushes Culture War Over Economic Reform’ (The 
Financial Times, 24 August 2019) <https://www.ft.com/content/f470734e-c41a-11e9-a8e9-
296ca66511c9> accessed 25 February 2020. 
51 Raphael Tsavkko Garcia, ‘Bolsonaro is Laying the Foundations of a New Dictatorship’ 
(Aljazeera, 11 December 2019) <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/bolsonaro-laying-
foundations-dictatorship-191209153455904.html> accessed 2 March 2020. Bolsonaro even 
joined a rally of his supporters calling for the closing of the Supreme Court in response to an 
investigation into his presidency. Anthony Beedle and Ricardo Brito, ‘Bolsonaro Joins Rally 
Against Brazil’s Top Court; Judge Warns Democracy at Risk’ (Reuters, 31 May 2020) 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics/bolsonaro-joins-rally-against-brazils-top-
court-judge-warns-democracy-at-risk-idUSKBN2370QJ> accessed 4 June 2020. 
52 Pires (n 35). 
53 The Economist (n 31). 
54 Jair Bolsonaro: ‘Brazil’s Firebrand Leader Dubbed the Trump of the Tropics’ (BBC, 31 
December 2018) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-45746013> accessed 27 
January 2020. 
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rhetoric, but also because of the similar ways that these two leaders have 
blamed law and regulation for what ails their countries. Trump’s 2016 
presidential campaign, organized around the theme of ‘Make America Great 
Again’, made classic populist and nationalist appeals.55 Trump has himself 
dabbled in authoritarian appeals, even claiming that he ‘alone can fix’ what ails 
American society.56 Since being elected, he has used his office and its privileges 
to investigate political opponents (and he has been impeached for doing so), 
and he regularly flouts other long-established legal and historical norms.57  
When it comes to public policy, Trump has made regulation a 
centerpiece of his agenda during both his campaign and administration, 
routinely using regulatory law as a scapegoat. Speaking to the Detroit 
Economic Club in one of his few substantive speeches as a candidate, Trump 
railed against regulation as ‘a hidden tax on American consumers, and a 
massive lead weight on the American economy’.58 Proclaiming that ‘[i]t is time 
to remove the anchor dragging us down’, Trump trotted out a favorite canard 
of the political right, asserting that ‘current overregulation is costing our 
 
55 As Trump has governed, observers have seen little that is populist about his policies. He has 
nominated numerous billionaires to his cabinet and his one major domestic policy 
accomplishment proved to deliver disproportionate tax relief benefits to the wealthy. David 
Smith, ‘Trump’s billionaire cabinet could be the wealthiest administration ever’ (The Guardian, 
2 December 2016) < https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/02/trumps-rich-
pickings-president-elects-team-could-be-wealthiest-ever> accessed 23 January 2020; Camilo 
Maldonado, ‘Trump Tax Cuts Helped Billionaires Pay Less Taxes Than the Working Class 
in 2018’ (Forbes, 10 October 2019) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/camilomaldonado/ 
2019/10/10/trump-tax-cuts-helped-billionaires-pay-less-taxes-than-the-working-class-in-
2018/#39c002bb3128> accessed 23 January 2020. 
56 Politico Staff, ‘Full Text: Donald Trump 2016 RNC Draft Speech Transcript,’ (Politico, 
2016) <https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-
acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974> accessed 24 April 2020. 
57 Peter Baker, ‘Trump Renews Attack on Justice System, Again Disregarding Barr’s Pleas 
(The New York Times, 20 February 2020) <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/us/politics/ 
trump-attacks-justice-system.html> accessed 24 April 2020; Paul Rosenzweig, ‘Trump’s 
Defiance of the Rule of Law (The Atlantic, 3 June 2019) <https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
ideas/archive/2019/06/trumps-unique-assault-rule-law/590875/> accessed 24 April 2020; 
Robert Reich, ‘Trump’s Assault on the Rule of Law’ (The American Prospect, 27 November 
2018) <https://prospect.org/power/trump-s-assault-rule-law/> accessed 24 April 2020. See 
also Cary Coglianese, ‘Legitimacy, Not Force, Is Key to Presidential Power’ (The Regulatory 
Review, 8 June 2020) <https://www.theregreview.org/2020/06/08/coglianese-legitimacy-not-
force-key-presidential-power/> accessed 10 June 2020.  
58 J. Brian Charles, ‘Transcript of Donald Trump’s Economic Policy Speech to Detroit 
Economic Club’ (The Hill, 8 August 2016) < https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/campaign/290777-transcript-of-donald-trumps-economic-policy-speech-to-detroit> 
accessed 15 April 2020. 
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economy as much as $2 trillion dollars a year—that’s money taken straight out 
of cities like yours’.59 The $2 trillion figure has been widely discredited, and 
no serious economist vouches for it.60 The former head of the U.S. Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Cass Sunstein, has even called it an ‘urban 
legend’.61 
Trump has often singled out environmental regulation for 
scapegoating. He declared, for example, that the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, under the Obama Administration, had waged a ‘war on 
coal’ that was destroying the coal industry in the United States.62 But multiple 
studies have shown what has long been obvious to investors and other financial 
analysts: the coal industry’s decline has come from decreased costs of natural 
gas—a competitive fuel source—and not from regulation.63 
Misleading the public about the impact of environmental regulations 
may seem like small potatoes compared to the inflammatory rhetoric Trump 
has used to attack other aspects of the law. He has called law enforcement 
officials ‘human scum’.64 He has accused federal judges of bias and racial 
 
59 Ibid. 
60 Richard W. Parker, ‘Hyping the Cost of Regulation’ (The Regulatory Review, 25 June 2018) 
<https://www.theregreview.org/2018/06/25/parker-hyping-the-cost-of-regulation/> accessed 20 
April 2020; Jodi L. Short, ‘Cutting Through the Rhetoric of Cutting Red Tape’ (The Regulatory 
Review, 31 July 2018) <https://www.theregreview.org/2018/07/31/short-cutting-rhetoric-cutting-
red-tape/> accessed 20 April 2020. For further discussion of this discredited figure, see Maeve P. 
Carey, ‘Methods of Estimating the Total Cost of Federal Regulations’ (Congressional Research 
Service, 21 January 2016) <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44348.pdf> accessed 21 April 2020. 
61 ‘Regulatory Policy Assessment, Sunstein, Part 1’ (C-SPAN, 3 June 2011) < https://www.c-
span.org/video/?299863-1/regulatory-policy-assessment-sunstein-part-1> accessed 21 April 2020. 
62 Cary Coglianese and Daniel Walters, ‘Whither the Regulatory ‘War on Coal’? Scapegoats, 
Saviors, and Stock Market Reactions’ (2020) Ecology Law Quarterly (forthcoming) 
<https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/paper/working-paper-whither-regulatory-war-coal> 
accessed 9 February 2020. 
63 Ibid. See also Trevor Houser, Jason Bordoff, and Peter Marsters, ‘Can Coal Make a 
Comeback?’ (Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy, April 2017) <https://energypolicy. 
columbia.edu/sites/default/files/Center%20on%20Global%20Energy%20Policy%20Can%20C
oal%20Make%20a%20Comeback%20April%202017.pdf> accessed 27 April 2020; John 
Coglianese, Todd D. Gerarden, and James H. Stock, ‘The Effects of Fuel Prices, 
Environmental Regulations, and Other Factors on U.S. Coal Production, 2008-2016’ (2020) 
41(1) The Energy Journal <https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/stock/files/the_effect_of_fuel_ 
prices_environmental_regulations_and_other_factors_on_u.s._coal_productions_2008-
2016.pdf> accessed 27 April 2020.  
64 Justin Wise, ‘Trump Calls FBI Investigators in Russia Probe ‘Human Scum’ (The Hill, 20 
April 2020) <https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/493631-trump-calls-fbi-
investigators-in-russia-probe-human-scum> accessed 29 April 2020.  
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prejudice—with some of these accusations being so outlandish that they have 
prompted the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court to issue a public rebuke 
of the President.65 Trump’s aides proclaim that conspiracy theories about a 
‘deep state’—that is, a government that plots against its own public—'is 100% 
true’.66 One of his early aides openly called for ‘dismantling the administrative 
state’.67 
Immediately after his inauguration, Trump pledged to reduce 
regulations in the United States by 75 percent.68 Not only did he appoint 
individuals as heads of regulatory agencies who share an anti-regulatory 
perspective, Trump also imposed by executive order a government-wide 
regulatory budgeting—or ‘one in, two out’—regimen.69 In 2017, Trump 
bragged that his administration would take the volume of federal regulation 
‘back below the 1960 level… fairly quickly’.70 With the 1960 regulatory code 
reportedly containing nearly 90 percent fewer pages of regulations than today’s 
code, the kind of deregulation that Trump was proposing would amount to a 
monumental shift in U.S. law.71 It also could not be done by Trump alone, as 
it would necessitate congressional action.  
 
65 Brent Kendall, ‘Trump Says Judge’s Mexican Heritage Presents ‘Absolute Conflict’’ (The 
Wall Street Journal, 3 June 2016) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-keeps-up-
attacks-on-judge-gonzalo-curiel-1464911442> accessed 25 April 2020; William Cummings, 
‘US Does Have ‘Obama Judges’: Trump Responds to Supreme Court Justice John Roberts’ 
Rebuke’ (USA Today, 21 November 2018) <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
politics/2018/11/21/john-roberts-trump-statement/2080266002/> accessed 25 April 2020.  
66 Tom Porter, ‘’The Deep State is 100% True’: Trump is Launching an All-Out Assault on 
the US Intelligence Community’ (Business Insider, 21 February 2020) 
<https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-all-out-assault-on-us-intelligence-community-
apparent-revenge-2020-2> accessed 24 April 2020.  
67 Jon Michaels, ‘How Trump is Dismantling a Pillar of the American State’ (The Guardian, 7 
November 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/07/donald-trump-
dismantling-american-administrative-state> accessed 27 April 2020. 
68 Chris Arnold, ‘President Trump to Cut Regulations by ’75 Percent’ – How Real Is That?’ 
(NPR, 24 January 2017) <https://www.npr.org/2017/01/24/511341779/president-trump-to-cut-
regulations-by-75-percent-how-real-is-that> accessed 19 January 2020. 
69 Bourree Lam, ‘Trump’s ‘Two-For-One’ Regulation Executive Order’ (The Atlantic, 30 
January 2017) <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/01/trumps-regulation-
eo/515007/> accessed 25 January 2020. 
70 Juliet Eilperin, ‘Trump Pledges to Cut Regulations Down to 1960 Levels – But That May 
Be Impossible’ (The Washington Post, 14 December 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/trump-pledges-to-whittle-federal-regulations-down-to-1960-levels/2017/12/14/ 
17de13a4-e119-11e7-bbd0-9dfb2e37492a_story.html accessed 28 March 2020. 
71 As one reporter put it, ‘[e]ventually, Trump promised, the administration plans to do away 
with some 165,000 pages of the more than 185,000 in the Code of Federal Regulations’. Denis 
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Several years into his tenure as President, Trump’s supporters have 
typically credited him with three main domestic policy accomplishments: tax 
legislation (which reduced tax rates primarily for wealthy people); the 
appointment of two justices of the Supreme Court and other federal judges; 
and deregulation. Trump has bragged that his administration ‘has cut more 
regulations in a short period of time than any other administration during its 
entire tenure’.72 But of course, he has not done so, nor has he come anywhere 
close to reducing regulations by 75 percent. In fact, the number of repeals of 
regulations has been extremely modest compared with his pledge.73 The 
biggest impact the Trump Administration has had on federal regulation has 
come from the slowing down of the issuance of new major regulations: as of 
January 2020, Trump had finalized 98 economically significant regulations, 
compared with Obama’s 175 in the same period of time and an average of 118 
across all Presidents since 1980.74 It is a gross exaggeration to claim that the 
direction the U.S. economy has taken over the last several years has had much 
if anything to do with what the Trump Administration has done in terms of 
‘deregulation’.75  
Not only has President Trump exaggerated what he has achieved, but 
he has not ceased to scapegoat the law when it seems to suit his interests. In 
2020, in the face of criticism of his administration’s slow response to the spread 
 
Slattery, ‘Trump’s promise to cut ‘red tape’ and loosen regulations not as easy as he says’ (New 
York Daily News, 1 January 2018) <https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/trump-
promises-roll-back-government-oversight-1960-level-article-1.3731239> accessed 4 May 2020. 
72 Jacob Pramuk, ‘Trump’s Bold Claims About Cutting Red Tape Give Democrats a Possible 
Weapon in 2020 Election’ (CNBC, 24 March 2019) < https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/24/ 
trump-claims-about-cutting-regulations-give-dems-2020-election-opening.html> accessed 9 
February 2020. His budget director recently bragged that the Administration has engaged in 
the ‘largest deregulation effort in modern history.’ Philip Wegmann, ‘WH Agenda Will 
Advance ‘Largest Deregulation Effort in History’ (Real Clear Politics, 30 June 2020) 
<https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/06/30/wh_agenda_will_advance_largest_de
regulation_effort_in_history_143576.html> accessed 30 June 2020. This claim is also patently 
false if by ‘modern history’ one reasonably includes the Carter Administration from 1977-1981, 
during which time the federal government made major moves to eliminate economic 
regulation of airlines, truck transportation, and certain energy markets. 
73 Brookings, ‘Tracking Deregulation in the Trump Era’ (Brookings, 22 January 2020) 
<https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulation-in-the-trump-era/> accessed 
28 January 2020. 
74 Andrew Hunter, ‘Deregulation Doing Little to Boost Economy’ (Capital Economics, 9 
January 2020) <https://www.capitaleconomics.com/publications/us-economics/us-economics-
focus/deregulation-doing-little-to-boost-economy/>accessed 14 May 2020. 
75 Cary Coglianese, ‘Let’s Be Real About Trump’s First Year in Regulation’ (The Regulatory 
Review, 29 January 2018) <https://www.theregreview.org/2018/01/29/lets-be-real-trumps-
first-year-regulation/> accessed 17 May 2020. 
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of a deadly coronavirus—including of his own repeated statements down-
playing the risks—Trump tried to shift the blame. His target: the law. ‘I don’t 
take responsibility at all’, he declared, ‘because we were given a set of 
circumstances and we were given rules, regulations, and specifications from a 
different time’.76 But this claim, perhaps not surprisingly, was also false. If the 
President or others in his administration had exercised responsible leadership, 
there was nothing in the law or in regulations that prevented quick action to 
start testing for the virus and acting to contain its spread.77 
 
The Political Economy of Legal Scapegoating  
 
Contemporary events in Britain, Brazil, and the United States reveal 
how law can be vilified and used as a scapegoat by populist leaders to advance 
their drive for public support. The political economy behind such scapegoating 
is similar to that underlying any scapegoating: some leaders see it to their 
advantage to blame something or someone else for a society’s problems. The 
alternative for these leaders might well mean having to help mass publics 
understand and accept the difficulties and tradeoffs at stake in addressing 
underlying social and economic problems, which might then also imply putting 
forward policy solutions that could be unpopular, such as raising taxes or 
cutting budgets. Scapegoating the law is simply easier than building coalitions 
around unpopular actions.  
Furthermore, legal scapegoating combines what appears on the surface 
to be a public-interested diagnosis of a problem—such as we are all 
‘suffocating’ due to regulation—with a set of solutions that appeals to the 
private interests that align themselves with populist leaders.78 When 
regulatory costs are disproportionately borne by a concentrated set of business 
actors, and regulatory benefits are diffused throughout society, solutions that 
relax regulatory protections are likely to deliver disproportionate private 
benefits in the form of cost-savings to politicians’ wealthy benefactors.79  
 
76 Linda Qiu, ‘Trump’s False Claims About His Response to Coronavirus’ (The New York 
Times, 15 March 2020) <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/us/politics/fact-check-trump-
coronavirus.html> accessed 14 May 2020.  
77 Ibid. See also James Fallows, ‘The 3 Weeks That Changed Everything’ (The Atlantic, 29 
June 2020) < https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/06/how-white-house-
coronavirus-response-went-wrong/613591/> accessed 30 June 2020. 
78 Bruce Yandle, ‘Bootleggers and Baptists—The Education of a Regulatory Economist’ (1983) 
AEI Journal on Government and Society <http://pirate.shu.edu/~rotthoku/Liberty/On%20 
Bootleggers%20&%20Baptists.pdf> accessed 30 January 2020. 
79 On the political implications of how regulatory costs and benefits are distributed, see James 
Q. Wilson, Politics of Regulation (Basic Books 1980). 
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It is surely no accident, for example, that Bolsonaro’s efforts to gut 
regulatory protections for the Amazon has served the interests of his wealthy 
political supporters in agriculture and ranching. Nor does it seem happenstance 
that coal industry executives in the United States and the politicians who seek 
their support have embraced the rhetoric of a regulatory ‘war on coal’. Such 
rhetoric is easier for the coal industry to embrace than to have to admit to 
employees and shareholders that they have been defeated in the marketplace 
by an alternative source of energy. Moreover, blaming regulation provides a 
basis for asking policymakers not merely for regulatory relief but, still better, 
for government subsidies that can deliver short-term financial gains to firms 
but can do little to address the underlying cause of an industry’s decline.80 
For politicians, legal scapegoating allows them to look like ‘saviors’ 
coming to the rescue of the economy.81 It is relatively easy, after all, to do 
something about regulation compared with the kinds of major structural or 
fiscal policies that might deliver meaningful macroeconomic returns.82 It has 
proven relatively easy, for example, for President Trump to project himself as 
a savior to energy industries by repealing the Obama Administration’s signa-
ture climate change regulation, claiming that this helped the economy, even 
though the Obama regulation had in fact never taken legal effect and could not 
yet have had any palpable effect on the economy.83 
 The political advantages that populists perceive from making law a 
scapegoat—and particularly from scapegoating regulation—dovetail with the 
difficult economic conditions that can drive some politicians to scapegoat 
minorities and migrants. Difficult economic times have a tendency to generate 
 
80 Jeff Brady, ‘Despite Bankruptcy and Illness, Bob Murray Remains a Loud Voice for Coal’ 
(NPR, 7 November 2019) <https://www.npr.org/2019/11/07/775764520/despite-bankruptcy-
and-illness-bob-murray-remains-a-loud-voice-for-coal> accessed 29 January 2020. For a 
discussion of the subsidies that have been proposed and offered to the coal industry in the 
United States, see Coglianese and Walters (n 61). 
81 Ibid. 
82 Christopher Carrigan and Cary Coglianese, ‘Oversight in Hindsight: Assessing the US 
Regulatory System in the Wake of Calamity’ in Cary Coglianese (ed), Regulatory Breakdown: 
The Crisis of Confidence in US Regulation (University of Pennsylvania Press 2012). 
83 In his 2018 State of the Union address to the nation, Trump declared that ‘we have ended 
the war on beautiful, clean coal’. Umair Irfan, ‘Trump’s Perennial ‘War on Coal’ Claim, Fact-
Checked’ (Vox, 31 January 2018) <https://www.vox.com/2018/1/30/16953292/trump-war-on-
coal-claim-fact-checked> accessed 16 April 2020. For further background, see Lisa Friedman 
and Brad Plumer, ‘EPA Announces Repeal of Major Obama-Era Carbon Emissions Rule’ (The 
New York Times, 9 October 2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/climate/clean-
power-plan.html> accessed 28 January 2020. 
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antipathy toward regulation.84 In the United States, the proportion of citizens 
who believed that there was ‘too much’ regulation spiked at the height of the 
Great Recession, in mid-2008. Likewise, ample social science research shows 
that scapegoating of ethnic minorities and migrants is more likely to occur in 
periods of declining economic conditions.85 For example, one study found that, 
following the 2008 global financial crisis, European countries experiencing 
severe economic impact exhibited pessimistic public attitudes toward 
migrants.86 It is also no accident that candidate Trump scarcely limited his 
scapegoating just to the law but made prominent in his campaign rallies his 
promise to build a border wall. Describing Latino migration ‘an invasion of 
our country’ and hurling other insults and dog whistles, Trump fueled an ‘us 
versus them’ mindset among his supporters.87  
 
How Laws Are Like Migrants 
 
 Although scapegoating the law is by no means normatively equivalent 
to scapegoating human beings based on their race or national origin, it is 
striking how law and regulation are, in important respects, a lot like migrants 
when it comes to the dynamics that lead to scapegoating. To understand the 
appeal that legal scapegoating can have to populist politicians, it helps to keep 
in mind at least five features that laws and migrants have in common that 
contribute to both of them being made scapegoats. 
First, laws, like migrants, are foreign to most people. Just as migrants 
come into a country from an outside location, laws and regulations often are 
created in a distant capital city by and through the interaction of various elites. 
In the United States, the nation’s capital, Washington, D.C., is both located 
far away from most people in the country’s heartland and a city with the 
 
84 Gallup, ‘Americans’ Views on Government Regulation of Business, Government Power 
(Trends)’ (Gallup, 2018) <https://news.gallup.com/poll/243674/americans-views-
government-regulation-business-government-power-trends.aspx> accessed 12 February 2020. 
85 United States Department of Justice, ‘Hate Crime: The Violence of Intolerance’ 
<https://www.justice.gov/archive/crs/pubs/crs_pub_hate_crime_bulletin_1201.htm> accessed 
8 February 2020. 
86 Joachim Vogt Isaksen, ‘The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Attitudes Toward 
Immigration’ (2019) 7(24) Comparative Migration Studies <https://link.springer.com/ 
article/10.1186/s40878-019-0127-5> accessed 9 February 2020. 
87 Philip Rucker, ‘’How Do You Stop These People?: Trump’s Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric 
Looms Over El Paso Massacre’ (The Washington Post, 4 August 2019) 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-do-you-stop-these-people-trumps-anti-
immigrant-rhetoric-looms-over-el-paso-massacre/2019/08/04/62d0435a-b6ce-11e9-a091-
6a96e67d9cce_story.html> accessed 29 March 2020. 
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highest concentration of individuals with graduate degrees. In the United 
Kingdom, the target of legal scapegoating was literally a foreign entity: the 
European Union. In many Briton's minds, the distance between London and 
Brussels was vast—both geographically and culturally. In the week leading up 
to his election as Prime Minister, for example, Boris Johnson used E.U. 
migration regulation to further his campaign, claiming that Britons had ‘seen 
quite a large number of people coming in from the whole of the E.U.—580 
million population—able to treat the U.K. as though it’s basically part of their 
own country’.88 In Brazil, Bolsonaro’s attacks on regulations related to mining 
and development on lands set aside for indigenous peoples combined his 
disdain for regulation as an ‘other’ with his and his supporters’ treatment of 
indigenous people as an ‘other’ as well. 
 Second, laws, like migrants, can be characterized by populist leaders in 
terms of their ‘impurity.’ Populists tend to contrast the status quo with an 
idealized purity that would exist if only migrants or certain laws were removed. 
Anti-migrant fervor often derives from or involves appeals to repugnant 
notions of ethnic or racial purity. Consider that President Trump described 
Mexican migrants as ‘rapists’ and Haitian migrants as ‘hav[ing] AIDS’, but he 
lamented that the U.S. does not have more immigrants from Norway, a 
predominantly white country.89 Trump has insisted that he will ‘always protect 
American families first’ against the influx of Somalian refugees, as if those 
migrants would have jeopardized the integrity of US households.90 In a similar 
vein—albeit not in such a racist manner—populists’ anti-law fervor can 
similarly derive from an appeal to a purified world, as was reflected in Britain’s 
Jacob Rees-Mogg’s contrasting futures, one bright and one bleak. Populists can 
make it seem as if purity in terms of individual autonomy and liberty can be 
guaranteed only if citizens break free of a regulated nanny state. As the 
Republican Minority Leader of the U.S. House of Representatives Kevin 
McCarthy once stated, ‘[w]e’re going to take a fresh approach, we don’t want 
bureaucracy touching everything’.91  
 
88 Adam Payne, ‘Boris Johnson Says He Will Stop Immigrants from Treating Britain ‘As Their 
Own Country’ (Business Insider, 9 December 2019) < https://www.businessinsider.com/boris-
johnson-says-he-will-stop-immigrants-treating-uk-as-their-own-2019-12> accessed 1 May 2020. 
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Third, tropes against migrants and laws offer simplistic solutions for 
what ails the world: just get rid of the migrants and the rules. What could be 
simpler than building a wall to keep migrants out? We see similar black-and-
white solutions when it comes to regulation too: regulations are bad, so the 
government should simply reduce them by 75 percent to boost the economy. 
One can forget all about the benefits those regulations might generate and 
simply focus on their costs. In reality, of course, regulations have both costs 
and benefits, and while some regulations surely need improvement, this does 
not mean that all regulations are bad. The problems facing any country’s 
economy are by no means easy or straightforward, but blaming regulation 
makes it easy to provide simplistic answers to those who are challenged by 
complexity. 
 Fourth, regulations and laws, like migrants, are relatively powerless in 
the face of a rhetorical or political assault. Laws themselves do not stand up 
and object, and they do not actively fight back. It is true that the European 
Commission, for example, has created a blog on which staff members post 
occasional corrections to Euro-myths.92 But no blog on an E.U. website is any 
match for the influence that Boris Johnson's diatribes can have on the British 
public when these falsehoods are published in the Telegraph or the Spectator. In 
the same vein, it is hard to counteract the vitriolic rhetoric fed daily to the two-
thirds of Americans who read Donald Trump’s tweets.93 And when Twitter 
flags some of his tweets as false or violative of the platform’s policies, the 
company only risks giving them greater prominence. 
 Migrants, of course, face a personal retaliation if they speak out. In the 
United States, migrants who protest the conditions of migration detention 
centers may find themselves subject to deportation. 94 Although the 
consequences for the law are neither so personal nor profound, if regulatory 
agencies respond to misleading claims or campaigns against their rules, they 
may actually violate a law prohibiting government from engaging in certain 
kinds of propaganda. During the Obama Administration, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) faced an orchestrated campaign of falsehoods by 
those opposed to a water pollution regulation that the agency had been 
developing. The EPA pushed back by creating a social media campaign to 
counteract false claims made by the farming lobby. Yet in the end, the federal 
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government’s auditing office concluded that the EPA had violated several laws, 
including one banning ‘covert propaganda’.95 Regulation, in effect, has one 
hand tied behind its back, unable to retaliate fully against attacks. 
 Fifth, and finally, just as anti-migrant rhetoric both demeans migrants 
and seeks to elevate non-migrants’ sense of superiority, anti-regulation rhetoric 
commonly tries to reinforce the superiority of those who are listening to it. 
Boris Johnson's kipper outcry, and his criticisms of banana-shape rules, did 
more than just disparage regulation; they conveyed to the British public a sense 
of superiority over E.U. regulators. By pointing to absurd examples, Johnson 
tacitly communicated to his audience that E.U. regulators lacked common 
sense and that British citizens, who obviously know better, could get along just 
fine without such regulation.  
 
The Consequences of Legal Scapegoating 
 
These five similarities between laws and migrants do not imply a moral 
equivalence between vitriol directed at people versus attacks directed to the law. 
By pointing to the several similarities between law and migrants, though, I do 
hope to reveal the law’s vulnerability to scapegoating. Give these similarities, it 
should hardly be surprising when we see populist leaders appropriating anti-
regulatory rhetoric and seeking to denigrate the law. But it still should be deeply 
concerning. Legal scapegoating has the potential to undermine public confidence 
in the law overall, posing risks to democratic liberal society. At a time when 
public confidence already is on the decline in a number of countries around the 
world, attempts by political leaders to denigrate the law using falsehoods, 
exaggerations, or violent rhetoric create a potential for a downward spiral that 
would make governance still more challenging and contribute to still more fertile 
conditions for authoritarian rule.96 
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 Governance depends greatly on public acceptance of and compliance 
with law. It is costly—indeed, impossible—for governments to monitor 
constantly the behavior of every individual and organization. Admittedly, 
some monitoring and sanctions are needed, but they have their limits. If 
punishment becomes excessive or is deployed indiscriminately, this can 
undermine public trust and provide would-be populists with fodder for 
regulatory scapegoating.97 Consequently, the best way to maintain social order 
is to foster ‘the public’s confidence in the law and increas[e] people’s 
willingness to defer to legal authorities’.98  
Legal scapegoating seems likely to erode such confidence. It could also 
help lay groundwork for a retreat from democratic governance. Tom Ginsburg 
and Aziz Huq have noted that ‘institutions tasked with maintaining the rule of 
law, or that provide a foothold for oppositional politicians, are targeted quickly’ 
by aspiring authoritarian leaders.99 Especially when legal scapegoating is 
combined with the scapegoating of elites, media, and other core institutions in 
society, it may contribute to an overall undermining of the legitimacy of 
elected leaders that is key to what Karen Stenner has called the ‘authoritarian 
dynamic’. As Stenner writes, ‘[i]n the extreme, authorities deemed illegitimate 
and norms deemed questionable can ultimately cause highly authoritarian 
[members of the public] to “withdraw” their consent from that normative order 
and to “reinvest” their inclinations elsewhere’.100 Blaming the law, in other 
words, could be one way of engendering a sense of normative threat that leads 
individuals with an authoritarian disposition to gravitate toward leaders 
promising to unify and stabilize social order.  
 
Implications for Action and Research 
 
 
What is to be done? The best solution would seem to be to restore 
public trust in government and other institutions. Declining public trust, as 
noted at the outset, creates a climate that makes members of the public 
receptive to populist appeals of all kinds, including those that scapegoat the 
law. When members of the public have strong confidence in its legal system, 
scapegoating that system should become more difficult. 
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That said, identifying the need to increase trust is one thing, but it is 
another altogether to specify how to restore trust once it has declined. Various 
chapters of this book offer promising steps that legislatures and regulatory 
bodies could take, whether through improved public consultation or better 
regulatory analysis. Enhancing the robustness of regulatory impact assessment, 
for example, might not only make law more effective and efficient, but it could 
make it much less likely that government will adopt silly or nonsensical rules 
of the kind that would provide fodder for those who wish to scapegoat law.  
As the examples in this concluding chapter should make clear, though, 
populists do not need facts or genuine fodder if they wish to scapegoat the law. 
If members of the public are already predisposed to view their government 
suspiciously, they can come to believe claims of legal scapegoating that have 
no grounding in reality. The challenge, then, is not merely to create better 
rules for the sake of avoiding blunders that could be held up by populists, but 
to create better rules simply because of a commitment to excellence in the 
delivery of public value.101 What ultimately is needed are legislative and 
regulatory processes that earn the public’s confidence because of the quality 
outcomes they produce, the integrity of the government officials and 
institutions that produce those outcomes, and the openness and fairness of the 
processes by which laws are made and enforced.102 
Achieving such excellence in governance and winning back public 
trust—especially in the face of broader societal factors contributing to 
mistrust—is no small task. While awaiting the outcome of broader efforts at 
trust restoration, it can be important at least to recognize legal scapegoating as 
a tool for at least some would-be authoritarians. Until legal scapegoating is 
recognized and called out, little can be done to counteract it.  
Recognizing the existence of legal scapegoating also opens up avenues 
for further scholarly research to understand why and when such scapegoating 
emerges, exactly how detrimental it can be, and what tactics responsible actors 
in government and the legal system can deploy to counteract it.103 Although in 
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this chapter I have highlighted three countries where populist leaders have 
scapegoated the law, other countries experiencing populism, such as Poland 
and Hungary, do not appear to have anti-regulatory fervor so immediately 
intertwined with their leaders’ populist rhetoric. One avenue for research 
would be to understand better why countries differ in the degree of legal 
scapegoating they experience. 
Although populist leaders in Poland and Hungary have deployed their 
own scapegoating against foreigners, they do not appear to place the same level 
of blame on law as have leaders in the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Brazil.104 This may perhaps be due to varying levels of pre-existing public 
support across the different countries. Hungarian and Polish citizens appear 
to have at least somewhat greater confidence in their governments than do 
publics in Brazil, the United Kingdom, and the United Sates, and the former 
countries have seen a greater increase in confidence over the last ten-year 
period than have the latter.105 Perhaps pre-existing frailty of trust is, in the 
end, the key factor explaining legal scapegoating. If so, then what is clearly the 
best solution—boosting overall public confidence—could also plausibly be the 
only meaningful way to prevent legal scapegoating.  
  
Conclusion 
 
Scapegoating the law is a real phenomenon. In an era of declining 
public trust in government, the reality is that populist leaders and aspiring 
authoritarians can turn law into a scapegoat in ways that may only accelerate 
their societies’ overall declining confidence in law and government. As such, 
legal scapegoating is worrisome and deserves attention and study.  
As much as lawyers, judges, and legal scholars might seem natural allies 
of the law to resist its scapegoating, they and members of the public more 
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generally must first recognize legal scapegoating for what it is and how serious 
it may be. In the countries examined in this chapter, legal scapegoating has 
arisen from within a larger social context in which public trust has already been 
on the decline due to factors such as inequality, economic distress, and discord 
induced by social media. When social and economic conditions have already 
weakened public faith in their government, populist leaders have greater 
incentives to exploit law’s vulnerability and seek to turn society further against 
the existing legal system.  
The law, in this respect, can be an easy target for those seeking to use 
rhetorical sabotage to undermine public trust. Researchers have much work to 
do, but the first step is to identify the phenomenon of legal scapegoating as 
worthy of inclusion in a larger research agenda focused on understanding the 
crisis of public confidence in the law and legal institutions. 
 
 
